Are the problems with state sector cops, due to just a few bad apples who have found their way into an inherently good institution?
Or, are the problems the inevitable outcomes of an inherently flawed institution, that no amount of cleaning out and reform can fix?
I've been variously promising and threatening a thread on institutional analysis for over a year. Recent posts by people who have been on the receiving end of police violence have both given the promise/threat new energy, and urgency, it'll keep me from hijacking those threads.
This is a discussion thread so please add, comment, disagree, argue, etc.
As a start, I would like to explore the calculation problem and the knowledge problem, and whether it is possible for state sector cops to ever provide a service which meets public expectations.
For this, I ask you to imagine a world in which all cops are good people, committed to protecting and serving, a world where problems cannot be blamed on bad apples.
The calculation problem was first exposed by a young Ludwig van Mises, in 1921, in an essay entitled "The problems of economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth", up until that point it was widely known that socialism had a problem with motivation ( under socialism, who takes the trash out?), but many still believed that socialism provided a more rational basis to providing goods and services than the anarchy of production, that is an unhampered market.
Mises explored this on its own terms, not as a one system good, other system bad polemic.
What he found was, that without private owners of the means of production, competitively bidding against each other for scarce resources (in the case of cops; labour, specialists like scientists and detectives, cars cameras etc), and competing for the money of freely choosing customers, then there was no basis for rationally apportioning those resources amongst their competing uses.
World socialism was never realised, so prices arising on markets in other parts of the world were available to guide soviet central planners, and the full calculational chaos foreseen by Mises was never completely realised, however chaotic the soviet system actually was.
Further examination of the calculation problem revealed that it also applies to both state sector provision, and to monopolies.
By taking money up front (whether coercively, or, in the case of some German states prior to Prussian annexation in the 1860to 1870 period, by voluntary contributions to a community chest) for a monopoly service, the central planners are falling foul of the calculation problem.
They have no rational way to know what kinds of people and equipment are required, where, when, or in what quantities, riot cops and mine resistant vehicles, or rape counselors, they don't know.
But couldn't we just tell them?
That's where the "knowledge problem" strikes.
The knowledge problem is set out in Frederic Hayek's 1945 paper, "The use of knowledge in society", it's widely available as a pdf, and although Hayek's prose style isn't the easiest, it is well worth reading. Like Mises (Hayek had been Mises' research assistant before the London School of Economics poached him) Hayek examines central planning against its own claims, it is not a question of this is bad because politics.
What Hayek shows, is that the information needed is distributed throughout the economy, rather than in the possession of a few individuals, and it is rarely in forms that can be communicated to a central planner in a timely manner.
Internet and fast computers do not alter this situation.
There have been several examples of this problem in the private sector, one that I've seen cited several places, involved the British Cooperative Wholesale Societies. Very briefly, the co-op is Britain's largest corporate farmer as well as a retailer.
They had conducted customer questionnaires, to see whether customers would like organic produce. Yes, of course they wanted it. So the co-op set about the several years process of gaining organic certification for their farms.
When faced with the whole range of choices of what to spend their own limited funds on, customers were unwilling to buy sufficient organic produce for the co-op to cover costs.
Even if we assume that our political decission makers are committed to providing services in line with community desires, they will still fall foul of the same problem that the co-op did.
The knowledge they need is only available in the form of the daily choices of individuals, of what to spend their own money on, and what not to spend on.
Or, are the problems the inevitable outcomes of an inherently flawed institution, that no amount of cleaning out and reform can fix?
I've been variously promising and threatening a thread on institutional analysis for over a year. Recent posts by people who have been on the receiving end of police violence have both given the promise/threat new energy, and urgency, it'll keep me from hijacking those threads.
This is a discussion thread so please add, comment, disagree, argue, etc.
As a start, I would like to explore the calculation problem and the knowledge problem, and whether it is possible for state sector cops to ever provide a service which meets public expectations.
For this, I ask you to imagine a world in which all cops are good people, committed to protecting and serving, a world where problems cannot be blamed on bad apples.
The calculation problem was first exposed by a young Ludwig van Mises, in 1921, in an essay entitled "The problems of economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth", up until that point it was widely known that socialism had a problem with motivation ( under socialism, who takes the trash out?), but many still believed that socialism provided a more rational basis to providing goods and services than the anarchy of production, that is an unhampered market.
Mises explored this on its own terms, not as a one system good, other system bad polemic.
What he found was, that without private owners of the means of production, competitively bidding against each other for scarce resources (in the case of cops; labour, specialists like scientists and detectives, cars cameras etc), and competing for the money of freely choosing customers, then there was no basis for rationally apportioning those resources amongst their competing uses.
World socialism was never realised, so prices arising on markets in other parts of the world were available to guide soviet central planners, and the full calculational chaos foreseen by Mises was never completely realised, however chaotic the soviet system actually was.
Further examination of the calculation problem revealed that it also applies to both state sector provision, and to monopolies.
By taking money up front (whether coercively, or, in the case of some German states prior to Prussian annexation in the 1860to 1870 period, by voluntary contributions to a community chest) for a monopoly service, the central planners are falling foul of the calculation problem.
They have no rational way to know what kinds of people and equipment are required, where, when, or in what quantities, riot cops and mine resistant vehicles, or rape counselors, they don't know.
But couldn't we just tell them?
That's where the "knowledge problem" strikes.
The knowledge problem is set out in Frederic Hayek's 1945 paper, "The use of knowledge in society", it's widely available as a pdf, and although Hayek's prose style isn't the easiest, it is well worth reading. Like Mises (Hayek had been Mises' research assistant before the London School of Economics poached him) Hayek examines central planning against its own claims, it is not a question of this is bad because politics.
What Hayek shows, is that the information needed is distributed throughout the economy, rather than in the possession of a few individuals, and it is rarely in forms that can be communicated to a central planner in a timely manner.
Internet and fast computers do not alter this situation.
There have been several examples of this problem in the private sector, one that I've seen cited several places, involved the British Cooperative Wholesale Societies. Very briefly, the co-op is Britain's largest corporate farmer as well as a retailer.
They had conducted customer questionnaires, to see whether customers would like organic produce. Yes, of course they wanted it. So the co-op set about the several years process of gaining organic certification for their farms.
When faced with the whole range of choices of what to spend their own limited funds on, customers were unwilling to buy sufficient organic produce for the co-op to cover costs.
Even if we assume that our political decission makers are committed to providing services in line with community desires, they will still fall foul of the same problem that the co-op did.
The knowledge they need is only available in the form of the daily choices of individuals, of what to spend their own money on, and what not to spend on.