Quite intensely so, the ideas of behaviorism that we study and think are true in the social sciences are based on Pavlov and Skinner
Yes and no. While I do agree that Skinner was horrific, thinking of Skinner in such bad terms is quite the dominant tendency of most behaviourists, more especially amongst animal specialists. Itâs true that for things going from animal behaviour to psychology/psychiatry to social sciences to general knowledge, a certain time is required but I donât think that in the academic world Skinner
perspectives are still given a lot of credit. I donât know the field of social sciences enough to have a clear cut-vision of whatâs the dominant view or at least in the majority of currents. You also quoted Sapolsky so I guess that you might already know quite a lot of the following.
However, Pavlovâs and Skinnerâs
methods do work, for best and worst. The conditioning and the association of cues. Albeit limited, it is very efficient. I have trained my cat with the ding dong clicker positive reinforcement technique, it looks
meaningless but it
works. Now I profoundly detest Skinner who is a torturer and a maniac, unempathetic, deranged mind. Heâs the kind of pseudo ultra-rational guy who will put animal to starve in a room if they donât find the right button to get out, and then concluding theyâre dumb. The ironic thing being that it was his own distorted idea of
what reason is that made him decide to do things that we now find profoundly irrational.
Experimentally, he didnât place animals in situations they could even hope to solve, as they just werenât environmentally realistic conditions for them to solve. Itâs as if you asked a toddler to solve a complex puzzle for a biscuit but letting them captive in a green room their whole life. Iâm forcing the trait, but really it isnât that far from that. Chances are that kid wonât have many opportunities or even the will to understand how a Chinese puzzle works. Perhaps most important Skinnerâs contribution to science is that animals
arenât just interested in food (that was
his supposition) and that placing them in conditions of torture will create all sorts of very conditioned, automatic, dumb responses. Sounds familiar?
Positive or negative reinforcement might be dumb, they do
work. If you want to teach something, positive reinforcement will work way better. If you want to produce avoidance and aggression, defo opt for the negative reinforcement. You can manage to extinguish sets of behaviours with negative reinforcement, but it will at the cost of having the animal (or the person) negatively
affected by it if you cannot make it or them avoid the origin of the negativity, that is the environment that causes it or yourself and, by extension, a collection of elements that are predicative of the conditions where the negative experience happens.
So, while conditioning really isnât
everything about teaching, learning and psychology, it still is a
very fundamental notion. The way we look at it now is however radically different than the one we did at his time. Unfortunately, he wasnât the only one to think like this at all.
Quite ironically, one of biggests Skinnerâs critiques was Konrad f*cking Lorenz. Lorenz, whoâs been a Nazi in his time, albeit "repenting," was all about trying to understand animals in their context and even socializing with them in order to have an actual close approach to behaviours you cannot observe if you arenât sufficiently closed. Very different from the "objectivity" stated by Pavlov, Skinner and co. Still, I find heâs quite full of projections on competitive or aggressive behaviour, I guess itâs not coming from a random place. However, just as Skinner, heâs made fundamental findings in animal psychology, very notoriously on the social behaviour of grey geese and intra-specific aggression. There is a book that did call my attention a long time ago, itâs called "Aggression: A Natural History of Evil" (what a title! that was in French though, Iâm uncertain they had this translation in English).
But in general, Iâd say that the characteristic Western vision of intelligence is conflated with the use of reason/abstraction. And the very term of rationality is actually foggier than what we think. In anthropology, there is one book (unfortunately still untranslated in English, La rationalitĂ© des croyances magiques (Rationality of Magical Beliefs), Pascal Sanchez) that is an anthropological review of anthropological studies on magics, beliefs, and reason. We often think of rationality as something that works. And itâs true, to an extent. Thing is, folks like Skinner also did believe that, so how come it doesnât work or not completely, visibly? The whole stance of the book (that is around 2000 pages) is to demonstrate that magic beliefs
do work, in many ways. And that, in many ways, reason acts as a mere
system of beliefs, with, in its experimental disposition, has allowed to huge technical leaps. It certainly allowed to promote certain modes of thinking, such as abstraction, and excluding others. It is also a system of belief that relies very heavily, if not almost entirely, on a certain type of technology that is writing, or the externalisation of memory. It allowed to preserve knowledge in bigger quantities than what a human is capable to store. You canât physically remind all that is the books youâve read. But you have the remembrance of the memory. You have a
path towards a knowledge. Like a sort of internal dictionary coupled with actual memories.
Alexander Luria has studied back in his time the cognitive impact of the knowledge of writing, and itâs absolutely massive. It throws people in an entirely different world, cognitively, with quite a clear effect of no-return. There is the world before and after learning to read and write. And with computational systems and network thinking, there is even more of this externalisation of memory not only on the form of semantics, words and numbers, but on the form of more or less raw data, very structured information such as videos, sounds, and so and on. This also probably will come with its cognitive changes, and I think weâre already seeing it at work in many aspects. 40 years ago people were used to remember an insane amount of phone numbers, addresses, geographic directions. Now itâs much less. Itâs not dumber. Itâs just different, and actually adaptive to the fact this type of information is now externalized to your phone or computed.
Now if language and abstract thinking are pretty recent, the limbic system, that is the one at play in disorders such PTSD, is much more deeply seated and therefore, less prone to quick adaptations. What has worked for millions of years is less likely to change than what has worked for only a few thousands. PTSD exists in animals rather distant from us. So the mechanisms exist since VERY, very long. On this, itâs quite the proof itâs very adaptive on a species scale on a very long run.
Sorry if Iâm slow to develop I hope this all isnât very boring or repeating what everyone already knows. But if we want to resolve whether or not PTSD or depression are adaptive, the thing is that we no longer are in the conditions that would create the disorder from a behaviourally adaptive point of view, and, in mirror, be susceptible to respond well to the collections of behaviours linked to these disorders. What I found very surprising with a study that I mentioned in my journal but that I donât manage to find anymore, is that depression
was adaptive in contexts where actual fast responses are bad. Sometimes, not to move or not moving fast is the best thing you can do. There are many situations where that does happen, even for a long time. Where being rather disinterested in your peers or in your environment is adaptive. We had situations like that. And they can be very long, so the set off of a tipping point where the disorder goes from acute to chronic isnât that absurd. That study just wanted to show that depression was possible to genetically inherit through stress factors on the parents only, but it had the collateral effect that the mice in question did actually perform better than healthy peers at performing cognitive tasks in unfamiliar environment. Because they didnât give a f*ck about it, to shorten it quickly. But they also were less combative and did surrender quicker to nice tests such as being trapped in a puddle of water they couldnât get out and would end up drowning.
There is also another effect in evolution that we often forget to take into account is that evolution is not necessarily optimal. It depends only on passing genes. And genes donât care if youâre feeling awful Theyâre genes. Evolution, is evolution. Nature, nature. Itâs not doing something to do something. Itâs not animated by the desire of optimization or anything. Itâs not animated at all. Basically, everything you see, although by many aspects amazing in complexity and structure, has no reason to be (here is our word again). You canât expect evolution to give something entirely adaptive in any sense. Even if you come back in times where our social structure and non-artificial environment very probably would be more "receptive" to what we call disorders now.
On this, I remember reading quite a lot of texts from the Middle Ages and itâs completely striking to see how many things familiar to us as disordered, mad, bad, uncivilized are simply spoken as to be a normâwith magnitudes. When you read Tristan and Isolde or Melusine, f*cking hell you can tell these folks were emotionally dysregulated as hell and many gruesome details are juxtaposed to day to day stuff with perfect tranquility. Or simply, knowing that they can die at any moment because the environment is largely more hostile and aggressive than what ours is. They still do comment that X character or person really is off the grid to the point of madness (psychosis seems to be the level to be reached to be considered
crazy), but anything before the point of losing contact with reality seems to be at the very least, quite okay. And here in the context of a Western type of civilization. Violence was just ubiquitous. Itâs wasnât an information. In a culture like this, PTSD and personality disorders (A, B and C by the way), again depending on the
magnitude, or even DID if you think about it, arenât that maladaptive. In Brazil, where violence in the streets is such that everyone you know has been robbed or physically assaulted at least one in their life, you really can tell that people are far more nervous and are scanning the streets visually all the time. You just have to. There is stuff that is super normalized in levels of aggression and fear. I donât think it should, but it is.
In chaotic contexts, things that are typical of these disorders do work. Now evidently one can argue that a chaotic context
is abnormal in itself, but if an entire species cannot resist to something abnormal, then weâre screwed. A species can sacrifice many individuals and even entire generations.
And even in a civilization scale. Aggression, colonization, imperialism, violence, slavery, coercion, manipulation, lack of empathy, all this works
very well on a whole to divide and conquer and multiply. Now, it doesnât mean itâs
indifferent, or that it always works, or that it works on an individual scale.
Also you can totally land on evolutionary outcomes that are
very suboptimal for an
entire species, while never being critical enough to have the trait extinct. Of this I always think of babirusa pigs that have their teeth growing all their life to the point of slowly killing them by pressing against their face. It just doesnât go fast enough to kill them young, and thatâs enough.
So there might well be all sorts of behaviours and characteristics that are pretty bad for the individual and/or the group but are nonetheless selected in because not selected out quickly enough. And this not only with genes. With culture too. So while all our shit can work to this extent, it might just be a dead end. Or not. Difficult to know.
So, knowing if something "makes sense" in terms of evolution (and evolution doesnât
make sense) is actually quite distinct of knowing if itâs good or bad, desirable or not.
Good and bad are moral judgements partially based on empathy but that also influence it. Over all, more or less the only thing you can use to decide is the factor of suffering, even more than the one of happiness. It produces suffering? Bad. It doesnât? Okay. Produces happiness, and suffering? Then bad, too. Having happiness at the cost of suffering isnât right. Having happiness in a cooperative way that makes more happiness and also in the long term and as far as we know, then good.
Quite simple. But with larger scales and growing complexity it quickly becomes mind-bogging. On this, we clearly arenât cognitively equipped to deal. Getting along all well as good as we can is technically a hellish problem.
So I guess at the end of this very long exposĂ© (sorry for its length I got a bit set off as it was a big part of my dissertation topic), what I mean is that if something used to be adaptive or even can individually be, it doesnât mean that it doesnât have to change. And that what we call "rational" might not be as stable or⊠rational as we think. Again, itâs difficult to know what we generally mean by reason as it isnât really much of a precise term. Empiricism? Heuristics? Logic? Cause? Adaption? Optimal adaption? Intelligence? Reason covers all of this and yet it has its special flavour.
Sorry I just ended up writing a novel so I cross posted with a lot of people. Iâm trying not to be too repetitious with what has already been said.
archeology keeps bumping itself with astrology
? Just curious.