Thanks for posting links to more.
I'm afraid I find the rebuttal article unreadable - being written entirely in sentences like "I am not being disingenuous when I say this museum of mistakes is valuable;" - so unfortunately I don't know what points that is making.
But with regard to the book review it sounds like the "there is no free will" arguments come from bogus conclusions. For example:
Probably the most influential among these discoveries were the results of the famous EEG experiments conducted by the physiologist Benjamin Libet and others in the early 1980s. They showed that the brain makes decisions before consciousness becomes aware of them.
This might apply to catching a ball, but I don't think that also means we don't make our decisions when it comes to choosing how to live. Did these experiments include EEG results for someone deciding, for example, where to move to? Did they monitor them spending six months talking on and off with their partner , friends, neighbours and work colleagues, thinking about it before falling asleep at night, looking things up on the internet, making trips to different areas on their days off and reading copies of the local paper to get a sense of the location? If not - and I doubt it - then how can you say their brain made the decision before they did?
He even allows for the possible usefulness of public moral condemnation: “It may be that a sham form of retribution would still be moral — even necessary — if it led people to behave better than they otherwise would.”
Er....how is it possible to behave better than you otherwise would if you have no control over it?
We can still condemn “the conscious intention to do harm,” he says,
Again, these seems contradictory. More than that, it isn't even as simple as a conscioius intention to do harm. There can be a choice not to see that we're doing harm, or a choice to excuse ourselves for doing it, or a choice not to do something about it today but think we'll address our stress etc later when things in our lives are more settled (and therefore we will do more harm tomorrow) etc etc.
Perhaps the book puts forward more convincing arguments than the review can convey?
I do think there are times when biology/biochemistry limits our choices. The survival instinct is one of them, also things like traumatic amnesia and extreme dissociation. I think the question isn't a general question "do we have free will?". I think the discussion has to be about a few very particular circumstances in which free will might be impaired - and perhaps a large number of circumstances in which that's claimed but free will might still be there.
I'm afraid I find the rebuttal article unreadable - being written entirely in sentences like "I am not being disingenuous when I say this museum of mistakes is valuable;" - so unfortunately I don't know what points that is making.
But with regard to the book review it sounds like the "there is no free will" arguments come from bogus conclusions. For example:
Probably the most influential among these discoveries were the results of the famous EEG experiments conducted by the physiologist Benjamin Libet and others in the early 1980s. They showed that the brain makes decisions before consciousness becomes aware of them.
This might apply to catching a ball, but I don't think that also means we don't make our decisions when it comes to choosing how to live. Did these experiments include EEG results for someone deciding, for example, where to move to? Did they monitor them spending six months talking on and off with their partner , friends, neighbours and work colleagues, thinking about it before falling asleep at night, looking things up on the internet, making trips to different areas on their days off and reading copies of the local paper to get a sense of the location? If not - and I doubt it - then how can you say their brain made the decision before they did?
He even allows for the possible usefulness of public moral condemnation: “It may be that a sham form of retribution would still be moral — even necessary — if it led people to behave better than they otherwise would.”
Er....how is it possible to behave better than you otherwise would if you have no control over it?
We can still condemn “the conscious intention to do harm,” he says,
Again, these seems contradictory. More than that, it isn't even as simple as a conscioius intention to do harm. There can be a choice not to see that we're doing harm, or a choice to excuse ourselves for doing it, or a choice not to do something about it today but think we'll address our stress etc later when things in our lives are more settled (and therefore we will do more harm tomorrow) etc etc.
Perhaps the book puts forward more convincing arguments than the review can convey?
I do think there are times when biology/biochemistry limits our choices. The survival instinct is one of them, also things like traumatic amnesia and extreme dissociation. I think the question isn't a general question "do we have free will?". I think the discussion has to be about a few very particular circumstances in which free will might be impaired - and perhaps a large number of circumstances in which that's claimed but free will might still be there.